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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lonnie Robert Johnson appeals from the judgment of conviction and
order of restitution entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of grand theft
by possession of stolen property and being a persistent violator of the law.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas
On October 19, 2007, Union Pacific Railroad ("UPR") Police Officer Dan
Milovanovic responded to a report of a signal wire theft in Lincoln County. (Tr.,
p.123, L.24

- p.124, L.4.)

Upon arriving at the location of the reported theft

Officer Milovanovic observed cut wires hanging from a signal pole adjacent to
the railroad tracks. (Tr., p.124, Ls.9-16, p.126, L.19 - p.127, L.3; Exhibit 2.) On
the ground near the tracks the officer observed a pile of green ten-gauge copper
signal wire that had been cut into three-foot sections and, right next to that, he
observed a T-shirt with the initials "L.J." written on the collar. (Tr., p.124, Ls.1620, p.127, Ls.10-18, p.129, Ls.16-21, p.130, Ls.18-21; Exhibits 3-5.)

Upon

further investigation of the area the officer found a footprint, fresh tire tracks, and
a plastic bag containing two receipts issued from Pacific Steel and Recycling
("Pacific Steel") to Lonnie Johnson. (Tr., p.125, Ls.2-20, p.127, L.19 - p.128,
L.6, p.130, Ls.6-13; Exhibits 7-8.) The first receipt showed that Johnson sold 87
pounds of copper to Pacific Steel on October 4, 2007, for $204.45. (Exhibits 8,
14.) The second receipt showed that Johnson sold 97 pounds of copper to
Pacific Steel on October 10, 2007, for $227.95. (Exhibit 8, 13.)

On October 23, 2007, Officer Milovanovic went to Pacific Steel to
investigate whether Johnson had sold UPR's signal wire to that company. (Tr.,
p.140, Ls.3-9, p.141, L.3 - p.142, L.1.) While there Officer Milovanovic observed
small pieces of what he recognized as UPR's six-gauge copper signal wire in
one of the scrap metal bins. (Tr., p.142, Ls.2-14; Exhibits 10-12.) The officer
inquired about the wire and learned that Pacific Steel had purchased it from
Lonnie Johnson for $232.65 on October 22, 2007. (Tr., p.142, L.7 - p.143, L.12;
Exhibit 9.) The total weight of the wire Johnson sold on that date was 99
pounds.

(Tr., p.142, Ls.22-25; Exhibit 9.)

After speaking with Pacific Steel

employees and comparing UPR's six and ten-gauge signal wire to the two types
of copper wire Johnson had sold' to the recycling company as scrap metal,
Officer Milovanovic obtained a warrant to arrest Johnson for grand theft. (Tr.,

The next day, Officer Milovanovic received a report that a vehicle
matching the description of Johnson's vehicle had been spotted near the railroad
tracks in Lincoln County at the site of the previous theft. (Tr., p.152, L.12

-

p.154, L.6, p.162, L.12 - p.163, L.2.) When Officer Milovanovic responded to
the scene Lincoln County officers had already placed Johnson under arrest.
(Tr., p.153, Ls.3-17.) Subsequent to Johnson's arrest, Lincoln County officers,
assisted by Officer Milovanovic, found and recovered "quite a bit" of UPR's six
and ten-gauge signal wire from the back of Johnson's vehicle. (Tr., p.153, L.5 p.156, L.lO.) When questioned about the wire after waiving his ~iranda'rights,

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Johnson told Officer Milovanovic that he had run over the wire while driving on
the UPR right-of-way and decided to take it for the scrap value. (Tr., p.156, L.23

- p.157, L . l l , p.161, L.23 - p.162, L.13.) Johnson admitted to the officer that he
knew it was wrong to take the wire, but denied having actually cut the wire down.
(Tr., p.162, Ls.13-23.)
The state charged Johnson with grand theft by possession of stolen
property in relation to the three batches of UPR copper signal wire he had sold to
Pacific Steel between October 4 and October 22, 2007. (R., pp.41-43, 48-51.)
The state also filed a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.48-51.) After a
two day trial a jury found Johnson guilty as charged. (R., pp.178, 180: Tr., p.386,
Ls.2-23, p.398, L.14 - p.399, L.22.) The district court entered judgment on the
jury's verdicts and imposed a unified sentence of 14 years, with five years fixed.
(R., pp.205-09.) The court also entered an order requiring Johnson to pay
restitution to UPR in the amount of $2000. (R., pp.218-20; Tr., p.457, Ls.15-19),
the amount of money a UPR employee testified at trial it would cost to replace
the stolen signal wire

(see Tr.,

p.223, L.4

appealed. (R., pp.210-14, 221-27.)

-

p.231, L.5).

Johnson timely

ISSUES
Johnson states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was there insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict
of guilt on the charge of grand theft?

2.

Did the district court err in failing to properly instruct the jury
that the State bore the burden of proof to establish that the
market value was not ascertainable; in failing to instruct the
jury that, in order to use replacement value, the State first
had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
replacement cost offered by the State was for property that
was similar in quality, design, and value as that alleged to
have been stolen; and further err in instructing the jury that
the State did not have the burden to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, facts other than those outlined by the
district court?

3.

Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Johnson's
constitutional right to present an adequate defense and to
compulsory process, when the court excluded an
exculpatory defense witness as a discovery sanction?

4.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct rising to the level of a
fundamental error when she referred to Mr. Johnson as a
"scavenger" and a '"buzzard;" and when she
mischaracterized the 'substance of Mr. Johnson's testimony
..
during closing arguments?

5.

Did the district court err when the court awarded restitution
in the amount of $2,000?

6.

Does proper application of the cumulative error doctrine
require reversal in this case?

(Appellant's brief, p.18.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Johnson failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in the jury
instructions?

2.

Was there substantial competent evidence presented at trial from which
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was guilty of
grand theft by possession of stolkn property?

3.

Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
by excluding the testimony of a non-disclosed defense witness?

4.

Has Johnson failed to show that he is entitled to relief with respect to his
appellate claims of prosecutorial misconduct?

5.

Has Johnson failed to establish an accumulation of trial errors warranting
application of the cumulative error doctrine?

6.

Has Johnson failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's
award of restitution?

ARGUMENT

I.
Johnson Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error,
In The Jurv Instructions
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Johnson argues that the district court failed to

properly instruct the jury regarding the state's burden of proof in relation to the
value element of grand theft.

(Appellant's brief, pp.29-34.)

Specifically, he

contends that the court was required to instruct the jury that, before the jury
could consider replacement cost as the appropriate measure for determining the
value of the stolen wire, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that: (1) the market value of the stolen wire could not be satisfactorily
ascertained; and (2) "the replacement cost proffered by the State was for
property reasonably close in quality, design, and value" to the stolen wire.
(Appellant's brief, p.31.) He also argues that the court erred by instructing the
jury that the state was not required to prove every fact in evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt.

(Appellant's brief, pp.31-33.)

Johnson's claims of

instructional error fail, however, because he did not raise them below and he has
failed on appeal to demonstrate error, much less fundamental error entitling him
to review of his claims for the first time on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether the jury instructions, when considered as a

whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a
question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v.

m,129 ldaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Jones,

125

ldaho 477, 489, 873 P.2d 122, 134 (1994). If the instructions given, taken as a
whole, fairly and accurately reflect the law, there is no error. State v. Stricklin,
136 ldaho 264, 267, 32 P.3d 158, 161 (Ct. App. 2001). To be reversible error,
any error in the jury instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the
complaining party. State v. Row, 131 ldaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089
(1998); State v. Colwell, 124 ldaho 560, 564, 861 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App.
1993).
C.

Johnson Has Not Properlv Preserved Or Presented His Claim Of Error In
The Juw Instructions Because He Did Not Raise It Below And Has Not
Shown That The Error He Claims On Appeal Is Fundamental
Ordinarily, a party may not "assign as error the giving of or failure to give

an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the
grounds of the objection." I.C.R. 30(b). However, even absent a timely objection
in the trial court, claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on
appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743,
748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007).

"An error is fundamental only when it 'so

profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the
accused of his fundamental right to due process."' Iri, (quoting State v. Lavy,
121 ldaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992)). Before the appellate court will
engage in a fundamental error analysis, the appellant must establish that the trial
court committed an error. Anderson, 144 ldaho at 748, 170 P.3d at 891.

Johnson asks this Court to review his claims of instructional error under
the fundamental error doctrine, claiming that, as given, the jury instructions in
this case "affirmatively relieved the State of its constitutional obligation of proof'
with respect to the value element of grand theft.

(Appellant's brief, p.31.)

Johnson has failed to show the fundamental error doctrine is applicable to this
case because he has failed to show an error "so egregious that it produced
manifest injustice by violating [his] due process rights." Anderson, 144 ldaho at
749, 170 P.3d at 892.
A jury instruction violates due process if it "fails to give effect" to the
requirement that "the State must prove every element of the offense" beyond a
reasonable doubt.

& The district court correctly instructed the jury as to the

elements of the offense and the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. (R., pp.156, 167-68; 173 (Instruction Nos. 4, 13, 13-A, 13-C,
13-F, attached hereto as Appendices A-E).)

That Johnson believes the

instructions could have been more detailed does not establish the instructions
were "so egregious" as to produce manifest injustice in violation of his due
process rights. Anderson, 144 ldaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892. Johnson has,
therefore, failed to demonstrate any fundamental error entitling him to review of
his claim for the first time on appeal.
Even if this Court reviews Johnson's instructional error claims, he has
failed to show error.

While the state undoubtedly has the burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt, that burden only extends to each essential element
of the offense for which the defendant is being tried,

see Stricklin, 136 ldaho at

268, 32 P.3d at 162, and to any fact that increases the maximum sentence the
court can impose, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (any fact
that increases sentence beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakelv v. Washinqton, 542 U.S. 296
(2004) ("statutory maximum" for purposes of Apprendi is the maximum the judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the verdict or guilty plea).
Contrary to Johnson's arguments on appeal, the court's instructions in this case
correctly communicated the state's burden.
Johnson was charged with grand theft by possession of stolen property.
The district court correctly instructed the jury on the state's burden of proof and
the essential elements of this offense. In addition to instructing the jury at the
outset of the trial that the state bore the burden of proving Johnson guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt (R., p.156 (lnstruction No. 4, attached hereto as Appendix
A)), following the presentation of evidence, the court gave lnstruction No. 13,
which clarified the state's burden of proof as follows:
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be
carried by the State of Idaho d,o not require the State to prove
every fact and every circumstance put in evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt. The burden of proof extends only to the
material elements of the offense. These material elements are set
forth in the following instruction.

(R., p.167 (Instruction No. 13); Appendix B.) Immediately following lnstruction
No. 13, the court gave lnstruction No. 13-A, setting forth the statutory elements
of theft by possession of stolen property. (R., p.169 (Instruction No. 13-A);
Appendix C.) The court then instructed the jury in lnstruction No. 13-C as to the

elements the state must prove to establish that Johnson was guilty of grand
theft, as follows:
If the evidence shows that the defendant took, obtained, or
withheld property by theft at various times from the same person;
and that the value of the property taken in each theft was one
thousand dollars ($1000) or less; and that the property was taken,
obtained, or withheld pursuant to one overall intent or plan to
commit a series of thefts; then you are to add together the values
of all the property taken, obtained, or withheld pursuant to that
overall intent or plan. If the total value of such property is more
than one thousand dollars ($1000), then the crime is Grand Theft.
The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that a theft is grand theft. If a theft is not grand theft, then it is petit
theft.
(R., p.179 (Instruction No. 13-C); Appendix D.) Finally, consistent with I.C.

33

18-2402(1?)(a) and ( I l)(c) and lCJl 575, which relate to value, the district court
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 13-F that:
The term "value" as used in these instructions means as follows:
The market value of the property at the time and place of the
crime, or if the market value cannot be satisfactorily
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a
reasonable time after the crime.
When the value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained
pursuant to any of the above standards its value shall be deemed
to be one thousand dollars ($1000) or less.

(R., p.173 (Instruction No. 13-F); Appendix E.)
Despite having failed to object to these instructions or to request any
additional instructions below

(seeTr., p.302, L.8 - p.303, L.10), Johnson argues

on appeal that these instructions were insufficient to convey to the jury the
state's burden of proof regarding the value element of grand of theft because
they did not specifically inform fhe jury that, before the jury could rely on

replacement cost as the measure of value for the stolen wire, the state was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the market value of the wire
could not be satisfactorily ascertained; and 2) the replacement cost proffered by
the state was for property reasonably close in quality, design, and value as that
alleged to have been stolen (Appellant's brief, p.31). Johnson is incorrect.
Although the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the value of the property stolen exceeds $1000 in order to convict Johnson of
grand theft, the state was not required to prove by that same quantum of proof
the method by which the jury was required to ascertain that value because the
method of valuation is not an essential element of the offense.

Neither

Apprendi, supra, nor Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), compel a contrary
conclusion. Apprendi merely holds that any fact that increases a defendant's
sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490. That the state has the
burden of proving the element of value beyond a reasonable doubt does not,
however, mean that the state must prove every single fact relevant to that
element beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the state must prove or disprove
i
not require otherwise.
value by a particular theory. ~ p p r e n ddoes
Johnson's reliance on Mullaney is likewise misplaced.

At issue in

Mullaney was whether a Maine law which required the defendant, who was
charged with murder, to prove he acted in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation, in order to reduce the murder charge to manslaughter, violated due
process. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684-85. The United States Supreme Court

concluded such a law did violate due process and ultimately held that it was the
state's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of
passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a
homicide case.

Id.at 703.

While the Court discussed the differences in possible

penalties between murder committed without provocation and murder committed
with provocation, the Court's opinion in relation to who had the burden of proof
was not dependent on the potential penalties. Rather, the Court's holding was
based upon criminal culpability and intent, which the state clearly has the burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. j& at 696-701. The logic of Mullaney
regarding the state's burden of proof on the element of intent, however, hardly
extends to an obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the appropriate
method of valuation in a theft case. Mullaney certainly does not require such,
and Johnson has provided no persuasive argument that the constitutional
principles articulated in Mullaney require the state to do so.
Johnson also relies on a Montana case, State v. Ohms, 46 P.3d 55 (Mont.
2002), and a Florida case, Robinson v. State, 686 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997), for the proposition that a trial court must instruct the jury that the
state has the burden of proving the proper method of valuation beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Appellant's brief, pp.25, 31 .)

Ohms and Robinson are both

sufficiency of the evidence cases in which the court concluded the state failed to
meet its burden of proving the value necessary to convict the defendant of grand
theft or felony theft. Although both cases hold the state has the burden of proof
in relation to value, Ohms, 46 P.3d at 58, Robinson, 686 So.2d at 1373, neither

goes so far as to hold that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that market value cannot be ascertained such that the jury may properly
rely on replacement value.
Moreover, there is no ldaho case that imposes such a requirement. In
fact, the only ldaho case that offers any guidance on this issue appears to
suggest otherwise. In State v. Huahes, the ldaho Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of value in the context of a claim that the evidence was insufficient to
prove the defendant was guilty of felony malicious injury to property. State v.
Huqhes, 130 ldaho 698, 702-04, 946 P.2d 1338, 1342-44 (Ct. App. 1997). The
court, after sumeying cases from other jurisdictions on the proper method for
quantifying value, adopted the following approach:
Either the diminution of the object's fair market value or the
reasonable cost of repair is a fair means of measuring damage
when the offender has harmed but not destroyed the property. If
the State applies the diminution of value measure, then it must
establish the fair market value of the property immediately before
and after the damage.
When the cost of repair is chosen, this measure may not
exceed the market value of the item before the damage, for an
offender cannot cause an economic loss that surpasses the actual
value of the property damaged. The defendant may challenge the
cost of repair measure, therefore, by presenting evidence of a
lesser fair market value.
When property has been entirely destroyed, neither the cost
of repair measure nor the diminution in value measure are
applicable. The proper measure of damages in such event is the
fair market value of the property at the time and place of its
destruction.
In some cases the destroyed item may have no market
value or the value may not be ascertainable. Therefore, upon a
showing that fair market value cannot be established, the State
may show the economic value of the loss caused by the defendant

through such factors as original purchase price, replacement cost,
the property's general use and purpose, and salvage value.
Hughes, 130 ldaho at 1343, 946 P.2d at 1343 (internal citations and quotations
omitted, emphasis added).
Nowhere in Hughes did the court suggest, much less hold, that the state
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the method by which the
jury must calculate value. To the contrary, the court's use of the words "a
showing" indicate proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in relation to
whether market value is ascertainable such that replacement value can be used
instead. This conclusion is consistent with the state's ability to prove value by
either diminution of fair market value or reasonable cost of repair. Huahes, 130
ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d at 1343. if the proper valuation method was an essential
element requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the state would not have the
ability to make such an election.
There is additional language in Hughes that also undermines Johnson's
claim that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the
replacement cost proffered by the State was for property reasonably close in
quality, design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen," in addition to
proving the replacement value exceeded $1000.

(Appellant's brief, p.31.)

Specifically, the court in Huahes stated, "If the State attempts to prove value
through replacement cost, however, we think it incumbent upon the State to
produce some evidence that the replacement item is of a quality and design
comparable to that of the destroye'd item." 130 ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d at 1343
(emphasis added). "Some evidence" fails far short of implying that the evidence

must be sufficient to satisfy the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
also Bembrv
-

See

v. State, 273 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. App. 1980) (rejecting

defendant's claim that the trial court was required to instruct the jury "on 'the
method of calculating the value of the damage to personalty;" and concluding the
trial court's instructions that it was the state's burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense as charged in the
indictment and that the crime charged was defined as the "intentional infliction of
damage to the property of another in excess of $100" "was a full and adequate
charge on the issue of damages as it related to the issue before the jury").
Even if, as Johnson asserts, the state is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the market value is not ascertainable and that the
replacement value is for "property reasonably close in quality, design, and value
as that alleged to have been stolen," there is no basis for concluding that the
instructions given in this case did not adequately communicate that burden. As
indicated above, the court clearly advised the jury that it was the state's burden
to prove each element of grand thefi, including value, beyond a reasonable
doubt. (R., pp.167-68 (Appendices B, C).) Johnson nevertheless contends, for
the first time on appeal, these instructions were inadequate, because lnstruction
No. 13 regarding the scope of the reasonable doubt instruction did not
specifically reference lnstruction No. 13-F, which defined value, lnstruction No.
13-F did not include a reasonable doubt instruction, and lnstruction No. 13
"affirmatively informed the jury that the State did not have to prove a fact beyond
a reasonable doubt unless the district court instructed them that this burden

existed for that fact." (Appellant's brief, pp.32-33.) All of Johnson's arguments
lack merit.
Although lnstruction No. 13 does not specifically reference lnstruction No.
13-F (Appendix E), the instruction defining value, the jury was instructed in
lnstruction No. 13-C (Appendix D) that the state had the burden of proving value
in excess of $1000 beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find Johnson guilty of
grand theft.

(R., p.170 (Appendix D).)

lnstruction No. 13-F (Appendix E)

informed the jury how to reach that determination. There is no reason to believe
the jury considered those two instructions separately when deciding whether the
state had satisfied its burden of proof in relation to value. Indeed, by finding
Johnson guilty of grand theft, the jury necessarily found the market value could
not be satisfactorily ascertained such that reference to the replacement cost of
the property was necessary. The failure to include another reasonable doubt
instruction within or in relation to lnstruction No. 13-F was not required to
adequately communicate the state's burden of proof.

See State v.

Boetger, 96

Idaho 535, 537, 531 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1975) (rejecting defendant's argument
that court erred in declining to give a separate reasonable doubt instruction
regarding value since the state's burden of proving value beyond a reasonable
doubt was already communicated in another instruction).
Inclusion of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement in
lnstruction No. 13-C (Appendix D) also eliminates any possibility that the jury
concluded the reasonable doubt standard did not apply to value simply because
lnstruction No. 13 (Appendix B) only referred to the elements instruction.

Johnson's claim that a "similar instruction was criticized" in State v. Rossianol,

2009 WL 1637035 (Ct. App. 2009), is misleading. The instruction at issue in
Rossianol stated, in relevant part:
The State must prove all the material elements of the offense
charged in the Information to be true beyond a reasonable doubt
before the defendant can be found guilty. In order to help you in
your duties as jurors I am going to outline for you the elements of
the crime for which the defendant has been charged.
The State must prove that on unknown dates between January,
[sic] 2005 and September, [sic] 2005 in ldaho that Mr. Rossignol
did commit lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age
as described in three of the counts against him and that he sexually
abused a child as described in the remaining count.
It is not necessary for the state to establish every fact and
circumstance put in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is
necessary to sustain a conviction that the facts and circumstances
in evidence, when taken together, establish beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the material elements of the offense that I have
outlined.
Rossianol at *I4
The court's criticism was not in relation to the portion of the instruction,
similar to lnstruction No. 13 regarding the scope of the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard; in fact, this type of instruction is "a true and accurate
statement of the law." Stricklin, 136 ldaho at 268-69, 32 P.3d at 162-63. Rather,
the court's criticism was based upon the trial court's "unfortunate choice of the
phrase 'outline for you the elements of the crime"' since the court apparently
failed to actually outline the elements. Rossiqnol at *14. Such criticism does not
apply here.

The court did exactly as it instructed the jury it would do in

lnstruction No. 13 - it followed that instruction with lnstruction No. 13-A, which
set forth the material elements of the offense.

The jury instructions in this, case viewed as a whole, fairly and accurately
reflect the law and the state's burden of proof. Johnson's claims fail to establish
the instructions were erroneous much less resulted in a due process violation
entitling him to challenge the instructions for the first time on appeal.
Even if this Court considers Johnson's instructional error claims for the
first time on appeal, and finds the instructions erroneous, any error is harmless.
In determining whether the error is harmless, the "inquiry [is]: is it clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty
absent the error." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (finding trial
judge's failure to instruct on the element of materiality harmless given that "no
jury could reasonably find that Neder's failure to report substantial amounts of
income on his tax returns was not 'a material matter" since the "evidence
supporting materiality was so overwhelming"); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S.
497, 503 (1987) ("While it was error to instruct the juries to use a state
community standard in considering the value question, if a reviewing court
concludes that no rational juror, if properly instructed, could find value in the
magazines, the convictions should stand."); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)
(concluding harmless error analysis applies to instruction that impermissibly
shifted the burden of proof on malice); State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 182,
191 P.3d 1098, 1102 (2008) (holding "the omission of the element that the
property taken be financial transadions cards is harmless error" given the jury's
conclusion that the defendant tookiand withheld property, which was the victim's

wallet, and the uncontroverted evidence that the wallet contained financial
transaction cards),
In light of the evidence presented at trial on the issue of value, which is
set forth in detail in Section II, infra, this Court can conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt that even if the jury had been instructed as Johnson claims
they should have been, the jury would have found Johnson guilty of grand theft.
Thus, even if Johnson has demonstrated fundamental error in relation to the jury
instructions, he is not entitled to relief because any error was harmless
II.
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence Presented At Trial From Which The
Jurv Found Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Johnson Was Guiltv Of Grand
Theft Bv Possession Of Stolen Property
A.

Introduction
Johnson argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence at trial

to establish that the value of the stolen signal wire exceeded $1000, the statutory
threshold for grand theft.
fails.

(Appellant's brief, pp.19-28.) Johnson's argument

A review of the record and the applicable law shows that the state

presented substantial competent evidence at trial from which the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the stolen wire Johnson possessed
exceeded $1000 and, as such, Johnson was guilty of grand theft.
B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered

upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 ldaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 ldaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App.
-

1987). In conducting

this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121
ldaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991);

m, 112 ldaho at 761, 735 P.2d at

1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hushes, 130 ldaho
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997);

m, 112 ldaho at 761, 735

P.2d at 1072.
C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which The Jury
Reasonably Found That The Value Of The Stolen Wire Exceeded $1000
Johnson argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence that the

value of the stolen wire exceeded $1000.

(Appellant's brief, pp.19-28.)

Johnson's argument is based upon three equally faulty assertions:

( I ) the

state's "evidence demonstrated that there was, in fact, a market value for the
copper wires and also established the value of the wires according to this
standard;" (2) "[tlhere was insufficient evidence . . . that market value could not
be satisfactorily ascertained" such that the jury could properly consider the
replacement costs (Appellant's brief, p.23), and (3) the "replacement value
proffered by the State . . . [was] not for property that was similar in quality,
I

design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen" (Appellant's brief, p.28).
Contrary to Johnson's assertions, a review of the correct legal standards and the

evidence presented at trial reveals the state submitted substantial, competent
evidence from which the jury could conclude the market value of the stolen wire
was not readily ascertainable such that replacement value could be considered
in calculating value, and the evidence of replacement costs presented to the jury
exceeded $1000, and were properly relied upon for purposes of determining
value. Johnson's sufficiency of the evidence claim, therefore, fails.
The jury was instructed, consistent with I.C. § 18-2402(1?)(a), that value
means "[tlhe market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if
the market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of
the property within a reasonable time after the crime." (R., p.173 (Appendix E).)
With respect to the value of the wire stolen by Johnson, the state presented
evidence from Douglas Richard, the manager of signal maintenance for Union
Pacific Railroad who is responsible for purchasing wire, that replacement wire
costs 25 cents per linear foot and that the wire must be purchased in "a reel of
2,000 linear feet," which contains 71 pounds of wire and costs $500.
p.220, L.17 - p.221, L.2, p.227, Ls.5-14, p.228, L.25

- p.229, 1.24.)

(Tr.,

Because

Mr. Richard could only purchase the replacement wire in 71 pound reels, he
would have to purchase four reels to replace the 283 pounds of wire stolen by
Johnson for a total replacement cost of $2000. (Tr., p.230, L.1 - p.231, L.5.)
This evidence was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the value
of the stolen wire exceeded the $1000 requirement necessary to find Johnson
guilty of grand theft.

Johnson first claims the foregoing evidence was not sufficient because, he
asserts, "the State's own evidence demonstrated that there was, in fact, a market
value for the copper wires and also established the value of the wires according
to this standard," which was the scrap value Johnson received when he sold the
copper wire taken from the railroad's signal wire.

(Appellant's brief, p.23.)

Johnson's argument in this regard rests upon the faulty premise that the state,
for purposes of proving value in a grand theft case, is restricted to the market
value for the wire when sold as scrap as opposed to the value of the wire as a
functioning whole. Several courts have rejected similar claims
For example, in State v. Cope, 438 P.2d 442 (Ariz. App. 1968), the
defendants were charged with grand theft for stealing the copper wire from inside
an electrical transformer, which wire was valued at $30.00. The transformer,
with the wire included, was valued at $117.00.

fi at

443.

On appeal, the

defendant argued, inter alia, that "the value of $1 17.00 for the transformer may
not be considered as defendants were not charged with stealing the transformer
itself, but merely the wire from the inside."

fi The court rejected this 'argument,

reasoning:
We must . . . assume as established by the evidence, that the
transformer was nothing more than a hollow shell of insignificant
value once the copper forming the coils therein was removed. By
defendants' act the transformer was reduced to a shell by the
removal of wire which had an intrinsic value of only $30.00. The
act of destruction was done to suit the convenience of the
defendants in that it was the copper wire which they wanted as it
had a ready market at the salvage yard. There can be no question
but that the owner suffered the loss of the transformer valued at
$117.00. The defendants feloniously deprived the owner of the
article itself by removing the principal thing of value which was in it.
In all logic, it was the value of this copper wire in place that was

taken from the owner. It was not simply copper wire of only
intrinsic value that was stolen, but rather wire which, by reason of
its patterned arrangement and design served special functions and,
as such, had a special value.

It is apparent that while copper wire has an intrinsic value of
approximately thirty-seven cents per pound as scrap, when it is in
place in certain complex equipment its value is greatly enhanced.
A person stealing an item with such a special value cannot claim
that since he could get only the ordinary price for the parts, he is
not guilty of theft of the higher amount.
Cope, 438 P.2d at 444.

The Oregon Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in State v.
-,

242 P. 1116 (Or. 1926), stating:
The question of the value of personal property is of twofold
importance. First, stolen property must have a value in order to be
the subject of larceny. Second, that value should be shown in
order to determine the degree of the offense. To go a step further:
In cases wherein the stolen property is smashed or rendered
useless for its original purpose, the value of such property is not its
value after having been demolished or broken up, but is its value at
the inception of the taking thereof. Thus, in the case at bar, the
value of the property was not its value as scrap iron after the
defendant had broken up the equipment, but was its market value
at Newberg[, the city from where the property was stolen,]
immediately prior to its destruction by him. The act of the
defendant in breaking the equipment into pieces in order to enable
him to handle it with less difficulty than in its original state
constitutes a part of his wrongful act in the taking thereof.

m,242 P. at 1118 (citation omitted).
Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with Cope and
Q,

m.See,

McClure v. State, 673 S.E.2d 856, 857-58 (Ga. App. 2009) (in determining

restitution, the victim is entitled to the fair market value of the copper including
value of the wire harnesses in which part of the copper was contained, not just

what the copper wire was worth as scrap metal); State v. Helms, 418 S.E.2d
832, 833 (N.C. App. 1992) (value of stolen pay telephone not limited to amount
of money in phone, but included replacement cost); State v. Landlee, 513 P.2d
186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (jury could conclude stolen copper wire valued in
excess of $100.00 based on testimony that replacement cost was $110.00 and
market value was $170.00 to $180.00 even though scrap value was only $30.00)
Johnson's claim that "[olther jurisdictions have . . . indicated that, where
there is proof of the price received by the defendant for selling wires alleged to
have been stolen, this proof is competent to establish the market value of the
wire" greatly overstates the content of the cases upon which he relies in support
of this claim. (Appellant's brief, p.23.) In Greene v. State, 406 So.2d 805 (Miss.
1981), the defendant complained on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing
testimony regarding the cost or value of stolen copper wire because, he
asserted, the testimony was hearsay.

406 So.2d at 808.

The Mississippi

Supreme Court found no error noting the substance of the witness's testimony
"was that he had sold scrap copper wire to different buyers at different times for
different prices."

id.

This conclusion hardly stands for the proposition that

market value is the same as scrap value for purposes of determining the
sufficiency of evidence in relation 'to the degree of theft for which a defendant
may be convicted.
Johnson's reliance on State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
Loddv v. State, 502 P.2d 194 (Wyo. 1972), and Dyba v. State, 549 S.W.2d 178
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977), for his claim that market value is no more than scrap

value is also misplaced. In

a,
the defendant claimed the value of the copper

wire he stole was improperly valued because, he asserted, "the value of the
copper wire was greatly increased when its insulation was burned off and
transported from Millard County to Salt Lake City," where it was worth more. 763
P.2d at 813. The court found Ott's argument "unpersuasive," concluding that
even if it "adopted defendant's argument, and valued the wire in its insulated
form, the evidence establishes that the value exceeds the $250 statutory
requirement."

Id.

In Loddy, the "[dlefendant argued that neither of the witnesses who
testified as the value of the copper wire was qualified, and therefore their
opinions should not have been received in evidence." 502 P.2d at 197. The
court denied relief on this claim due to Loddy's failure to object but noted that the
witness "was competent to testify as to the value of the wire, and this constituted
sufficient evidence of the value of the property to be submitted to the jury."

Id.

Finally, at issue in DVba was whether the state failed to demonstrate that
stolen oxygen cylinders were worth $50.00 or more. 549 S.W.2d at 179. A
witness testified that he sold the cylinders for $59.50.

Id. at

180.

Dyba

nevertheless "insist[ed] . . . that the market value was not proved, and, therefore,
the value of the cylinder is to be ascertained according to its replacement cost."
Id.
-

The court rejected Dyba's argument, finding "[mlarket value was

demonstrated," therefore, under Texas law, there was no need to ascertain
replacement value.

Id.

Neither Greene, Ott, Loddy nor Dvba support Johnson's claim that market
value is limited to scrap value.

Conversely, Cope, Albert, and the cases

consistent with their holdings provide sound reasoning why market value should
not be limited to scrap value, particularly where the defendant's actions have
rendered the item valueless as anything other than scrap. Applying this logic to
the facts of this case, the state in this case was not required to utilize scrap value
as the market value for the wire stolen in its functioning form. Johnson's claim
to the contrary fails.
Johnson's claim that "[tjhere was insufficient evidence . . . that market
value could not be satisfactorily ascertained" likewise fails. (Appellant's brief,
p.23.) Mr. Richard testified that even if the railroad could recover some of the
stolen wire, it is "not a good practice" to use wire that has been "chopped up"
because it has to be "sleeve[dIn together. (Tr., p.224, Ls.9-16.) Moreover, Mr.
Richard testified the railroad is required to purchase wire through their "supply
system" where he is "given a few choices," but he has "to pick one of those."
(Tr., p.221, Ls.11-15.)

This is adequate evidence from which the jury could

conclude that there is no market for signal wire that has been destroyed by
removing the copper wire such that replacement cost was the appropriate
method of valuation. Beasley v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1960), is
instructive on this point.
In Beasley, the defendant was charged with larceny for stealing copper
wire "which was used in the block signal system" by the Illinois Central Railroad
Company. 339 S.W.2d at 180. With respect to value, the evidence presented at

trial was "the testimony of an employee of the railroad that the purchase cost of a
similar quantity of new wire would be $37.89; that used wire with the insulation
on it has practically no market value, but with the insulation burned off it can be
sold as scrap."

Id.at 181 (emphasis original).

The court found this evidence of

value sufficient to sustain Beasley's conviction, stating:
For the purposes of a grand larceny prosecution the value of
the stolen property is not the original cost nor the sale price for
junk, but evidence of such cost or price is admissible as tending to
establish the value. The true criterion is the fair market value of the
property at the time and place it was stolen, if there be such a
standard market; if not, the value must be arrived at from the facts
and circumstances and the uses and purposes which the article
was intended to serve.
In other jurisdictions evidence of
replacement cost has been held admissible in the absence of an
established market value.

In view of the fact that the wire here in question had no
practical market value, the evidence of its replacement cost was
admissible. There was nothing in the evidence to show that the
wire was in a deteriorated condition, and it may be considered a
matter of common knowledge that copper wire has a long period of
useful life. Therefore the jury reasonably could conclude, from the
fact that new wire would cost $37.89, that the stolen wire was worth
at least $20 [as required in order to convict Beasley of grand
larceny].
Beasley, 339 S.W.2d at 181 (citations omitted).

Helms is also analogous.

418 S.E.2d 832. The state charged Helms with

larceny for stealing a pay phone having a value in excess of $400. 418 S.E.2d at
832. A witness from the telephone company "testified that the cost of replacing
the telephone and enclosure would be $1,542" and that "he could not state a
market value of the stolen property."

Another witness also "testified that he

was not aware of a market or market value for the stolen property."

Id.at 832-

33. On appeal, the defendant claimed there was "insufficient evidence that the
stolen property had a fair market value over $400." Irl, at 833. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed, holding:
[ w h e r e stolen property is not commonly traded and has no
ascertainable market value, a jury may infer the market value of the
stolen property from evidence of the replacement cost. In the
present case, there was no evidence of "market value" of the stolen
property with the exception of the $162.50 contained in the
telephone. However, evidence was presented that the telephone
and enclosure were not common articles having a market value
and that the replacement cost of the items exceeded $1,500.

The court in Helms also noted "[olther jurisdictions have held that where
the stolen property has a unique or restricted use and there is no ascertainable
market value, replacement cost may be considered in determining value." Irl,
(citing State v. Day, 293 A.2d 331 (Maine 1972); People v. Renfro, 250
Cal.App.2d 921, 58 Ca.Rptr. 832 (1967); State v. Randle, 410 P.2d 687 (1966);
Clark v. State, 197 S.W.2d 111 (1946)).
As in Beasiey and Helms,there was sufficient evidence presented in this
case from which the jury could reasonably conclude there was no practical
market for the signal wire once it was cut in pieces and had the copper wire
removed from it. As such, it was appropriate for the jury to assess value by
,:

reference to the replacement costs.

Johnson's final argument in relation to value is that the "replacement
value proffered by the State . . . [was] not for property that was similar in quality,
design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen." (Appellant's brief, p.28.)
This argument, like Johnson's other arguments regarding value, fails. As an

initial matter, it is questionable whether the requirement that the "replacement
item [be] of a quality and design comparable to that of the destroyed item"
translates to items like signal wire, w h i ~ his not a consumer good like the garage
door at issue in Hughes where the Court of Appeals first articulated the state had
an obligation to "produce some evidence" of such. 130 ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d
at 1343. The state certainly understands the principle that a victim's choice of a
replacement "may bear little or no relationship to the quality and value of the
destroyed property, and the classification of the offense as a misdemeanor or a
felony should not turn upon the victim's choice between a higher quality, more
expensive replacement and a lower quality, more modestly priced item."
However, where, as here, the victim has effectively no choice in its replacement
options, such a principle is not relevant.
Even if the comparable quality and design principle is relevant here, the
state presented evidence that the replacement wire was "of a quality and design
comparable to that of the destroyed item." Huahes, 130 ldaho at 703, 946 P.2d
at 1343. Specifically, Mr. Richard testified he buys "one type of line wire . . . a
number ten gauge covered line wire" (Tr., p.227, Ls.5-7), that the wire he buys
has to comply "with certain codes the railroad sets," and the "line wire has to be
a certain strength" (Tr., p.221, L.23 - p.222, L.2). Further, Officer Milovanovic
testified the stolen wire came from line wire, which included "number ten signal
wire." (Tr., p.124, Ls.10-18; see also Tr., p.133, Ls.12-14.) From this evidence,
the jury could conclude that due to railroad specifications for signal wire, the

replacement wire was of a comparable quality and design suitable to the purpose
for which it was used.
Johnson, however, argues the state's evidence actually demonstrated the
contrary, i.e., that "there were significant differences in the quality and design of
the wire alleged to have been taken and the wire used to calculate replacement
cost." (Appellant's brief, p.27.) A review of the testimony Johnson relies on in
support of this argument reveals otherwise. On cross-examination, Mr. Richard
testified as follows:
Q:
Okay. Now what is -- I imagine there is a significant
difference between these two wires and the wires you would
replace them with?
A:.

There is a difference, yes

Q:

These two wires are very old?

A:

I would say that's correct.

Q:

The green tinted wire is obviously a little corroded?

A:

That's correct, oxidized copper, yes

Yes. And the brown tinted wire, you can see that there is
Q:
actually some insulation still left on there that's falling off?
A:

Old tape and braid insulation, yes, ma'am

Q:

So tape and braid, that's fiber and tar, is that also accurate?

A:

That's probably a good explanation.

Q:
Okay. So we've got two very old kinds of wire that -- would
you say that these wires have less value than what you are
replacing them with?
A:

I wouldn't say they had less value.

A:

I mean, I'm not an expert on that. To me I guess I'm not --

Q:

You're not a scrap metal dealer?

A:

There you go, there you go, yeah.

(Tr., p.235, Ls.1-25.)
Contrary to Johnson's characterization of this testimony, Mr. Richard did
not testify there was a "significant difference" between the two wires, he merely
acknowledged there was "a difference." Moreover, nothing about Mr. Richard's
testimony establishes the differences were meaningful in terms of value. In fact,
he specifically disagreed that the old wires had less value. That the wires may
have lesser value as scrap says nothing about the comparative value of new wire
versus old, intact wire. Indeed, the fact that the wires were old does not mean
they were not as functional as the new wire. In fact, Mr. Richard testified the
railroad replaces wire when it is destroyed or stolen, notably omitting any need to
replace the wire simply because it was "old." (Tr., p.220, Ls.17-24.) Thus, to the
extent the comparable quality and design principle is relevant to this case, the
jury could easily conclude from Mr. Richard's testimony that the replacement wire
satisfied this requirement.
The state met its burden of presenting substantial, competent evidence
from which the jury could, and did, conclude that Johnson stole signal wire with a
value in excess of $1000, the statutory minimum for grand theft. Johnson has
failed to establish otherwise.

111.
Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
Bv Excludinn The Testimony Of A Non-Disclosed Defense Witness

A.

Introduction
After the state rested, Johnson's counsel requested permission to add to

the "defense witness roster" a previously undisclosed witness, James Arterburn.
(Tr., p.240, L.16 - p.241, L.3, p.252, L.24 - p.253, L.3.) According to defense
counsel, Mr. Arterburn was the brother of Randy Arterburn, a man whose name
appeared along with Johnson's on the October 22, 2007 receipt from Pacific
Steel. (Tr., p.240, Ls.17-20; see also Exhibit 9.) Defense counsel advised the
court that the defense had known about James Arterburn and had tried to locate
him before trial, but had "been unsuccessful until he walked into the courtroom
[that] morning." (Tr., p.253, Ls.5-8; see also Tr., p.240, Ls.16-24, p.253, L.22 p.254, L.7.) Defense counsel further advised the court that, if allowed to testify,
Mr. Arterburn would be expected to testify that he saw "two rolls of wire behind
[Johnson's] brother's house," which, according to defense counsel, would
corroborate Johnson's yet to be given testimony that at least some of the copper
signal wire he sold to Pacific Steel came from his brother's house. (Tr., p.241,
Ls.4-9, p.254, Ls.10-23.) He would also be expected to testify that he gave
Johnson permission to use Randy Arterburn's name in connection with
Johnson's sale of copper wire to Pacific Steel on October 22, 2007. (Tr., p.241,
Ls.7-9.)

When asked by the trial court whether the state had any position
regarding the defense's request to call James Arterburn as a witness, the
prosecutor objected, explaining:
I have never been made aware of the fact that defense counsel
was searching for any other witnesses in this case. I could see that
possibly they would look for Randy Arterburn, whose name
appears on one of the receipts that came from Pacific Steel and
Recycling, but I have no knowledge of this witness. l did speak
with him out in the hallway. I think this is extremely late discovery
and the state has already rested. I don't believe that the witness
should be allowed to testify.

(Tr., p.253, Ls.9-20.) The prosecutor also advised the court that she had served
upon the defense a standard request for discovery under Idaho Criminal Rule
16. (Tr., p.255, Ls.3-7.)
After hearing argument from both parties, the district court denied
Johnson's request to call James Arterburn as a witness. (Tr., p.255, L.12
p.256, L.17.) The court explained:
Well based upon the representation that discovery was
requested under Rule 16 by the state to the defense, which means
that the prosecutor requested the defendant to furnish the state a
list of names and address the defendant intends to call at trial, I'm
going to not permit the calling of Mr. Arterburn. I find that the
disclosure of him at this juncture is way beyond late.
It's not an issue of whether Mr. Arterburn could be found or
not. The issue is whether he could be called as a witness. I would
assume that that knowledge was well within the province of the
defendant in this case long ago. Whether Mr. Arterburn could
actually be produced as a witness is not the issue. I think the state
is entitled to notice of that and I think at this juncture having rested
their case, that there is no reasonable basis for excusing the
disclosure of that potential witness.
All witnesses are potential witnesses. Some of them are
called and some of them aren't. The standard is [sic] whether I'm
really going to call that witness to trial or whether I can really get

-

that witness to court or not, we would have an issue under Rule 16
that has never been an issue for me before that has been
contemplated and I don't think that that's the standard.
It is the court's discretion to impose sanctions with regard to
discovery violations. The pretrial order in this case required
disclosure of witnesses to be completed long ago. I'm not going to
permit Mr. Arterburn to testify in this case.
(Tr., p.255, L.12-p.256, L.17.)
Johnson argues on appeal that .the district court abused its discretion by
excluding Mr. Arterburn's testimony, contending that the court improperly
excluded the testimony without requiring the state to show that it was prejudiced
by the late disclosure, without balancing the prejudice to the state against
Johnson's right to a fair trial, and without considering less severe remedies for
the late disclosure than exclusion. (Appellant's brief, pp.35-40.) Johnson has
failed to show any basis for reversal, however, because he has failed to show
from the record either that the district court abused its discretion or that he was
actually prejudiced by the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony.
B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of

an appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court." State v.

Huntsman, 146 ldaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing
v. Allen, 145 ldaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). See also
State v. Anderson, 145 ldaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). "[TJhe trial
court's exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court
unless it has been clearly abused." State v. Stradley, 127 ldaho 203, 208, 899

P.2d 416, 421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 ldaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d 495,
496 (1977)).
C.

Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Excludina Mr. Arterburn's Testimony
Rule 16 of the ldaho Criminal Rules requires a defendant, upon written

request of the prosecuting attorney, to furnish the state a list of names and
addresses of the witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial. I.C.R. 16(c)(3).
A written response to the state's discovery request must be served within 14
days of service of the request. C R 16(e)(l) The failure to timely comply with
the request is grounds for the imposition of sanctions. I.C.R. 16(e)(2).
When deciding whether to exclude a defense witness as a sanction for a
discovery violation, the trial court must "balance the prejudice to the State due to
the lateness of disclosure against the defendant's right to a fair trial." State v.
Martinez, 137 ldaho 804, 807, 53 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State
v. Miller, 133 ldaho 454, 457, 988 P.2d 680, 683 (1999); State v. Harris, 132
ldaho 843, 846-47, 979 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (1999); State v. Lamphere, 130
ldaho 630, 633-34, 945 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1997)). The court must also consider "less
severe remedies ... that might serve as an alternative to excluding the evidence."
State v. Saxton, 133 ldaho 546, 548, 989 P.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing
State v. Winson, 129 ldaho 298, 303, 923 P.2d 1005, 1010 (Ct. App. 1996);

Harris, 132 ldaho at 846, 979 P.2d at 1204).

Contrary to Johnson's argument on

appeal, application of these principles to the facts of this case shows the district

court properly exercised its discretion in excluding Mr. Arterburn's testimony as a
sanction for Johnson's failure to have disclosed him as a witness before trial.
In deciding whether to exclude Mr. Arterburn's testimony the district court
clearly determined that the state was prejudiced by the lateness of the
disclosure. (Tr., p.255, L.20

- p.256, L.4.)

This determination is supported by

the record which shows that, despite having known about Mr. Arterburn before
trial, Johnson never disclosed him as a potential witness in response to the
state's pretrial request for discovery and waited, instead, to spring him as what,
at least according to defense counsel, was in essence an alibi witness on the
second day of trial, after the state had rested its case. (Tr., p.240, L.16 - p.241,
L.9, p.253, Ls.5-8, p.253, L.22 - p.254, L.23.) In addition to being extremely
suspect, the timing of this disclosure was also inherently prejudicial to the state
who, as explained by the prosecutor, had no prior knowledge that Mr. Arterburn
even existed, much less that he was a potential witness in the case. (Tr., p.253,
Ls.11-20.)

If, as defense counsel asserted, Mr. Arterburn could corroborate

certain details of Johnson's testimony regarding his procurement of the stolen
wire, it was incumbent upon Johnson to disclose his name before trial to allow
the state its own opportunity to attempt to contact him and investigate the facts
underlying his proposed testimony.

See

State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 899

P.2d 416 (1995) ("Our rules contemplate that counsel must make a good faith
determination of the witnesses to be called and do so at a time when meaningful
discovery can be conducted."). His failure to do so deprived the state of any
meaningful opportunity for discovery and was prejudicial.

Relying on State v. Lamphere and State v. Harris, supra, Johnson argues
that the lateness of the disclosure of Mr. Arterburn as a witness was not
sufficient by itself to sustain the court's finding of prejudice to the state.
(Appellant's brief, pp.38-40.) While the state agrees that Lamphere and

Harris

both hold that exclusion of a defense witness based solely on the lateness of the
disclosure of that witness is improper, the state submits that the facts of
Lamphere and

Harris

are distinguishable and do not compel a finding that the

district court abused its discretion in this case.
This is not a case, like Lamphere, where the defense witness was
disclosed to the state several days before trial.

See Lamphere,

130 ldaho at

632, 945 P.2d at 3. Nor is it a case, like Harris, where the failure to disclose the
witness before trial was entirely inadvertent. See Harris, 132 ldaho at 845, 979
P.2d at 1203. To the contrary, the record in this case shows, and the district
court found, that Johnson knew about Mr. Arterburn well before trial, but
consciously failed to disclose him as a potential witness until he showed up on
the second day of trial, after the state had rested its case.
p.240, L.16

- p.241, L.9, p.252, L.24 - p.256, L.17.)

(See,generally, Tr.,

While Johnson's conduct

may not have risen to the level of a willful violation2 of the discovery rules, it was

While it is certainly suspicious that Mr. Arterburn just happened to show up at
trial immediately before the defense was to begin its case in chief, the state
acknowledges that there is no evidence in the record that would support a finding
that Johnson's failure to disclose Mr. Arterburn as a witness was "willful," i.e.
"motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the
effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence,"
State v. Martinez, 137 ldaho 804, 807, 53 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Ct. App. 2002); see
also State v. Huntsman, 146 ldaho 580, 587 n. 3, 199 P.3d 155, 162 n. 3 (Ct.
App. 2008), nor did the district court make such a finding in this case.

nevertheless egregious and justified the court's finding of prejudice to the state.
Johnson also argues that, in excluding Mr. Arterburn as a witness, the trial
court "failed entirely" to balance any prejudice that might be suffered by the state
against Johnson's right to a fair trial, and also failed to consider alternative
sanctions. (Appellant's brief, pp.39-40.) The state disagrees. Although the
court did not explicitly articulate that it had considered the impact exclusion of
Mr. Arterburn's testimony would have on Johnson's right to a fair trial or whether
lesser sanctions would have been sufficient to remedy the prejudice to the state,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the court did not actually consider
these factors before deciding to exclude Mr. Arterburn's testimony. The court
clearly perceived its decision as one of discretion. (Tr., p.256, Ls.13-14.) That
the court exercised that discretion in favor of exclusion shows, at least implicitly,
that the court did not believe such exclusion would seriously undermine
Johnson's right to a fair trial.

The record and applicable law support this

determination because, although defense counsel asserted that Mr. Arterburn
could corroborate certain aspects of Johnson's testimony, she failed to make any
showing that Mr. Arterburn's testimony would actually be "relevant or helpful to
the defense in any significant way." State v. Thomas, 133 ldaho 800, 992 P.2d
795 (Ct. App. 1999).
The Court of Appeals' decision in Thomas is instructive. Thomas was
charged with kidnapping a man with whom his ex-wife had a relationship. 133
ldaho at 801-02, 992 P.2d at 796-97. On the second day of trial, after Thomas
had testified and the defense had rested, defense counsel moved to reopen his

case to present additional testimony from Thomas and also to call Thomas' exwife as a witness. & at 802, 992 P.2d at 797. According to defense counsel,
the nature of Ms. Thomas' testimony would have been to impeach statements
made by the victim, to discuss contacts she had with the victim after the charged
incident, to discuss the circumstances of Thomas' arrest, and to identify the
clothing Thomas was wearing on the night in question.

The prosecutor

objected to the request to present Ms. Thomas' testimony because she had not
been disclosed as a witness and because, in reliance on defense counsel's
pretrial representation that she would not be called, the prosecutor had not
secured the attendance of three witnesses who he anticipated would be needed

ki. Finding that the state would be prejudiced,
the trial court refused to allow Ms. Thomas to testify. Id.
to rebut Ms. Thomas' testimony.

On appeal from his conviction, Thomas challenged the exclusion of Ms.
Thomas' testimony, arguing that the trial court had failed to adequately consider
his right to a fair trial or alternative sanctions.

& at 803, 992 P.2d at 798. The

Court of Appeals found Thomas' argument unpersuasive, reasoning:
Proffered evidence must be relevant and possess some
probative value to exculpate the defendant or to rebut the
State's case before the defendant's request to present the
evidence can have any weight to be balanced against
prejudice to the State. Here, the defense presented no offer of
proof or description of the proposed testimony that would indicate
its relevance; rather, defense counsel merely described, in the
vaguest terms, the general subject matter that would be addressed
by the testimony. He stated that Ms. Thomas would impeach [the
victim's] testimony about what happened on the night of the
offense, but Ms. Thomas was not present during the kidnapping
and thus could offer no first-hand knowledge of those events.
Defense counsel also said that Ms. Thomas would testify regarding
Thomas' clothing on the night of the offense, the circumstances of

his arrest, and her contacts with [the victim] after the kidnapping.
However, the facfs to which Ms. Thomas would testify were not
described, and counsel's obscure description of the intended
testimony demonstrates nothing of any relevance or exculpatory
value. In short, the defense made no showing that the exclusion of
the testimony would have any adverse effect on Thomas' right to a
fair trial.
Id. (bold emphasis added). Because Thomas failed to make any showing in the
district court that Ms. Thomas' testimony "would have been relevant or helpful to
the defense in any significant way," the Court of Appeals concluded Thomas had
failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony.
Id.
In this case, as in Thomas, Johnson failed to make any showing in the
trial court that the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony would have had any
adverse effect on Johnson's right to a fair trial. Like defense counsel in Thomas,
Johnson's defense counsel presented no offer of proof, but merely described in
general terms the anticipated subject matter of Mr. Arterburn's testimony, as
follows:
He would be expected to testify that he saw the two rolls of wire
behind Lonnie's brother's house. He went with him the day that he
went to get the trailer, and also that he gave him permission to put
his, that roll, the deposit on the 22nd on the account owned by
himself and his brother.
(Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel argued that Mr. Arterburn's testimony was
"important to help the jury get a full picture of what happened, to help them get
an accurate picture of where the wire that's subject to this case came from and
whether or not Mr. Johnson knew that it was stolen." (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-$4.)
Defense counsel failed, however, to demonstrate that any of the proposed

testimony was actually helpful to the defense or relevant to rebut the state's
case.
The undisputed evidence at trial showed that Johnson sold copper wire to
Pacific Steel on three separate occasions in October 2007. (Exhibits 8, 9, 13,
and 14.) Officer Milovanovic and a Pacific Steel employee identified the wire
Johnson sold as UPR number six and number ten signal wire, based upon the
wires' distinctive characteristics. (Tr., p.124, Ls.10-20, p.142, L.4 - p. 147, L.21,
p.196, L13 - p.204, L.21.) Johnson testified that, when he sold the wire to Pacific
Steel, he did not know the wire was UPR signal wire and did not know or have
reason to believe that it was stolen. (Tr., p.273, L.23 - p.274, L.13, p.299, L.8 p.300, L.7.) Specifically, with respect to the first two batches of wire he sold,
Johnson testified that 'he had found the wire, in two rolls, behind his deceased
brother's house. (Tr., p.262, L.8 - p.263, L.24.) Johnson admitted finding the
third batch of wire near the railroad tracks. (Tr., p.288, Ls.11-16.) He also
testified that James Arterburn was with him when he sold the third batch of wire
to Pacific Steel on October 22, 2007, and that Mr. Arterburn told the man at
Pacific Steel to use Randy Arterburn's (James Arterburn's brother) name on the
receipt. (Tr., p.288, 1.17 - p.289, L.13.)
While James Arterburn's testimony, as described by defense counsel,
may have corroborated Johnson's testimony regarding both the existence of two
rolls of wire behind Johnson's brother's house and the fact that Mr. Arterburn
gave Johnson permission to use Randy Arterburn's name on the receipt for the
third wire sale, neither of these facts were relevant to the jury's ultimate

determination regarding Johnson's knowledge and intent to dispose of stolen
property. Defense counsel stated that Mr. Arterburn would testify he saw two
rolls of wire behind Johnson's brother's house, but there is no indication in the
record regarding the timing of that observation in relation to Johnson's first and
second sales of wire. Nor is there any indication that Mr. Arterburn had any firsthand knowledge regarding the origin of the rolls of wire he observed, or even
that the wire he observed was the same wire Johnson sold to Pacific Steel on
October 4 and October 10, 2007. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Arterburn was
present and permitted Johnson to use Randy Arterburn's name on the receipt for
the sale of wire on October 22, 2007, is entirely irrelevant to the issue of
Johnson's knowledge and intent. Even by Johnson's own account, Mr. Arterburn
was not with Johnson when he obtained the third batch of wire and, as such,
could not testify to any fact necessary for the jury to conclude, one way or the
other, whether Johnson knew or had reason to know that the wire was stolen.
(Tr., p.288, L.11 -p.289, L.18.)
In short, Johnson's defen& counsel, like defense counsel in Thomas,
made no showing that the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony would have any
deleterious effect on Johnson's right to a fair trial. Because Mr. Arterburn's
proposed testimony was not relevant to exculpate Johnson or to rebut the state's
case, the district court did not err in excluding it. Thomas, 133 Idaho at 803, 992
P.2d at 798. Johnson has failed to show an abuse of discretion

D.

Even If Error, The Exclusion Of Mr. Arterburn's Testimony Was Harmless
"'Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test is whether there

is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 ldaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d
1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 ldaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d
936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991)). The district court properly exercised its discretion in
excluding Mr. Arterburn's testimony. However, even if error, the exclusion of the
testimony was harmless because there is no reasonable probability under the
facts of this case that the exclusion contributed to Johnson's conviction.
First, for the reasons set forth above, Mr. Arterburn's testimony was not
relevant to any issue to be decided by the jury. Because Johnson made no
showing that the exclusion of the testimony would have any deleterious effect on
the fairness of his trial, any error in its exclusion was harmless.

See State v.

Saxton, 133 ldaho 546, 989 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1999) (trial court's failure to
perform required balancing test before excluding evidence was harmless where
defendant made no showing that evidence sought to be introduced was
relevant).
Second, if, as asserted by 'defense counsel, the purpose of Mr.
Arterburn's testimony was to corroborate Johnson's testimony that he procured
the first two batches of wire from his brother's residence, such testimony would
largely have been cumulative of other evidence already presented at trial. As
pointed out by defense counsel during her closing argument, Pacific Steel
employee Russell Cornia testified regarding conversations he had with Johnson

in which Johnson told him he had obtained the wire from his deceased brother.
(Tr., p.201, Ls.1-25, p.344, Ls.1-4.)

Because the jury had already heard

Johnson's version of events from a state witness, the exclusion of Mr.
Arterburn's testimony could not reasonably have contributed to the verdict. See
State v. Sadier, 95 Idaho 524, 532, 511 P.2d 806, 814 (1973) (evidence that is
"merely cumulative" is harmless and not a basis for reversal).
Finally, even assuming Mr. Arterburn's testimony was not entirely
irrelevant or cumulative, its exclusion was nevertheless harmless in light of the
overwhelming evidence of Johnson's guilt. Officer Milovanovic found Johnson's
belongings at the scene of the signal wire theft and subsequently positively
identified the copper wire Johnson sold to Pacific Steel as UPR number six and
number ten signal wire. (Tr., p.124, L.2 - p.125, L.20, p.124, Ls.10-20, p.142,
L.4

-

p.147, L.21, p.196, L13 - p.204, L.21.)

The next day, officers

apprehended Johnson at the scene of the signal wire theft and found "quite a bit"
of UPR number six and number ten signal wire in his vehicle. (Tr., p.152, L.12 p.156, L.22.) When questioned about that wire, Johnson admitted he knew it
was wrong to take it.

(Tr., p.162, Ls.6-15.)

This evidence, though mostly

circumstantial, overwhelmingly pointed to Johnson's guilt. Given the weight of
the evidence, any error in the exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony could not
reasonably have affected the outcome of the case and was therefore harmless.
Johnson has failed to show any basis for reversal.

Johnson Has Failed To Establish That He Is Entitled To Relief With Respect To
His Appellate Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Johnson did not object at trial to the prosecutor's closing argument.

Nevertheless, he contends on appeal that the prosecutor made comments
during her closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's
brief, pp.42-48.) Johnson's argument fails, however, because he has failed to
show that the prosecutor's arguments amounted to fundamental error, much less
that they deprived him of a fair trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly improper

closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct "'only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious to
result in fundamental error."' State v. Severson, 2009 WL 1492659, * I 7 (2009)
(quoting State v. Porter, 130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997)),

rehearing denied. Such error is fundamental only if it is "calculated to inflame
the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant, or is
so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors
outside the evidence." State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913
(1994). More specifically, "[p]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments
will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so egregious or
inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been remedied by a
ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be

disregarded." State v. Cortez, 135 ldaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App.
2001).
Even if fundamental, an error is harmless, and therefore not reversible, if
the court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have
been reached had the error not occurred.

Id. at

pp. 25-26.

Thus, a mere

assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by
the United States Supreme Court:

"[llt is not enough that the prosecutors'

remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwri~ht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."); State v. Reynolds, 120
ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate
review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any
such misconduct did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial")
C.

Johnson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor's
Concluding Remarks
After discussing in detail the elements of grand theft by deception of

stolen property and the evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor made the
following remarks near the conclusion of her closing argument:

On a new note, ladies and gentlemen, the railroad is a long
celebrated industry, but it is definitely in decline. There is a lot of
competition out there these days. There is [sic] semis, boats,
planes, and most of all technology, but that doesn't make it okay for
thieves to be targeting railroad property. Railroad lines are not for
scavengers and that is what the defendant is. He is a scavenger.
He is a buzzard. He is picking off the bones of the railroad
industry.
(Tr., p.330, L.25 - p.331, L.8.) Johnson argues on appeal that "the prosecutor's
remarks about the celebrated nature of the railroad industry, and its current
vulnerability due to its state of industrial decline, were in no way based on any
evidence that was admitted at trial," and, he speculates, "[tlhe only purpose for
such argument is to arouse and evoke the jury's sympathies." (Appellant's brief,
p.45.) He also argues that, combined with the prosecutor's reference to Johnson
as a "buzzard" and "scavenger," "these remarks were so inflammatory as to rise
to the level of fundamental error." (Id.) Johnson is incorrect.
First, contrary to Johnson's assertion, the prosecutor's reference to the
celebration and decline of the railroad industry was not improper argument
merely because it was not based on any evidence presented at trial.
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the right to
discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising from therefrom.
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v.
Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The purpose of
the prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450,
816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). However, not every word a prosecutor
utters during closing argument must be based on the evidence presented at trial.

It is well accepted that a prosecutor, like defense counsel, "may make remarks,
not based on the record, which concern matters of general knowledge and
experience" Revnolds, 120 ldaho at 450, 816 P.2d at 1007 (citing ABA Standard

9 5.9), and, in so doing, "may resort to poetry, cite fiction, reference anecdotes or
tell jokes"

Id. (citing J.

Stein, Closing Argument

3

12, at 23 (1990)). Because

there can be no question, in light of continuing and well known advancements in
the transportation industry, that the decline of the once celebrated railroad
industry is a matter of general knowledge and experience, the prosecutor's
anecdotal reference to it was not error, much less fundamental error that
deprived Johnson of a fair trial.
Second, also contrary to Johnson's assertion on appeal, there is nothing
in the record to indicate that the prosecutor's remarks about the celebration and
decline of the railroad industry were designed to "arouse and evoke the jury's
sympathies." (Appellant's brief, p.45.) While it is undoubtedly improper to invite
the jury to convict based on sympathy for the victim, see, e.a., State v. Severson,
2009 WL 1492659, *21 (2009); State v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477,
483 (Ct. App. 2008), a review of the prosecutor's argument, in context, shows
she did not invite the jury to do so in this case, see Reynolds, 120 ldaho at 450,
816 P.2d at 1007 ("[Tlhe propriety of a given argument will depend largely on the
facts of each case.").
Immediately before making the complained of comments, the prosecutor
had taken the jury painstakingly through the jury instructions, the elements of the
charged crime, and the trial evidence that proved Johnson's guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. (Tr., p.316, L.18 - p.330, L.24.) After spending nearly her
entire argument outlining the elements and the proof, the prosecutor ultimately
asked the jury to find Johnson guilty, not because the railroad industry is in
decline, but because the evidence showed he stole over $1000 of copper signal
wire from the railroad.

(See Tr., p.331, Ls.17-20 ("Don't let this defendant

minimize his actions. Hold him fully accountable for what he did.

Find the

defendant guilty of grand theft by possessing stolen property.").) Given this
context it is clear that the prosecutor's reference during her concluding remarks
to the state of the railroad industry in general was not an inflammatory appeal for
the jury to render its decision on anything other than the evidence presented at
trial. Johnson has again failed to show error, much less fundamental error that
deprived him of a fair trial.

State v. Adams, 2009 WL 1522666, "6 (Ct. App.

2009) (prosecutor's request for justice for victims not inflammatory appeal to
convict on anything other than evidence and, therefore, not fundamental error,
where remarks came immediately after description of how the trial evidence
proved Adams' guilt).
Finally, the prosecutor's reference to Johnson as a "buzzard" and a
"scavenger," while potentially unflattering, was not so egregious or inflammatory
as to rise to the level of fundamental error.

See

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho

496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999) (reference to defendant as "murdering
dog" improper, but did not rise to level of fundamental error). Unlike the epithet
"murdering dog" uttered by the prosecutor Hairston, the words "buzzard" and
"scavenger" used by the prosecutor in this case do not even carry a criminal

connotation. Nor are they words that improperly assailed, or even related to,
Johnson's credibility. Compare, State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 716, 85 P.3d
1109, 1175 (Ct. App. 2003) (calling defendant a "liar" improper, but not
fundamental error).

Rather, as Johnson himself appears to acknowledge on

appeal (Appellant's brief, pp.44-45), the prosecutor merely used the words as a
metaphor to describe Johnson's behavior. Had Johnson's trial counsel believed
the prosecutor's remarks so overstepped the bounds of permissible argument as
to potentially deprive her client of a fair trial, any error could easily have been
remedied by a timely objection and the giving of a curative instruction.
Johnson's counsel apparently had no such belief, however, because, rather than
objecting, she elected to address the prosecutor's comments and make specific
use of them during her own argument (Tr., p.336, Ls.15-19 (referring to
prosecutor's buzzard analogy), p.346, L.8 - p.347, L.5 (arguing the util~tyof
buzzards in nature)), even going so far at one point as to say, "Being a buzzard
is not a bad thing" (Tr., p.347, L.5). That Johnson's trial counsel elected to make
use of the prosecutor's terminology instead of object or move for a mistrial when
the comments were made is a strong indication that trial counsel made a tactical
choice, and did not believe that any error denied Johnson a fair trial. That
appellate counsel now wishes to change tactics does not show fundamental
error.

D.

Johnson Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Misstated His
Testimonv, Much Less That The Alleqed Misstatements Constitute
Fundamental Error
In arguing to the jury that the evidence showed Johnson knowingly

disposed of stolen property, the prosecutor stated that Officer Milovanovic and
Johnson "both I.D. the third batch that came in [to Pacific Steel] as Union Pacific
Railroad wire." (Tr., p.318, Ls.16-18.) She also argued that, on the day of his
arrest, Johnson admitted knowing the wire in his possession "was probably
stolen."

(Tr., p.324, Ls.15-20.)

Johnson contends on appeal that these

arguments misstated his testimony and "created the false impression that the
State had direct evidence in the form of a confession as to the element of Mr.
Johnson's purported knowledge that the wire was stolen." (Appellant's brief,
pp.45-46.) Johnson's argument is unavailing because a review of the record
shows no fundamental error, or even error at all, in relation to the complained of
arguments.
Johnson testified at trial and specifically denied knowing either that any of
the wire he sold to Pacific Steel was UPR property or that it was stolen. (Tr,,
p.273, L.23

- p.274,

L.13, p.299, L.8 - p.300, L.7.) However, when asked to

identify the third batch of wire he sold to Pacific Steel on October 22, 2007,
Johnson readily admitted that the wire he sold was the same wire Officer
Milovanovic had photographed in a Pacific Steel recycling bin (Tr., p.281, L . l l p.284, L.1), wire that had previously been identified by the officer as UPR
number six signal wire (Tr., p.142, Ls.4-18, p.144, Ls.2-3, p.147, Ls.9-21). In
arguing the significance of Johnson's testimony the prosecutor did not, as

Johnson suggests on appeal, represent that the testimony constituted an
admission by Johnson that he knew the wire was UPR property when he
disposed of it. Rather, in arguing that Johnson had "I.D.'d" the third batch of wire
as UPR wire, the prosecutor was only accurately pointing out that Johnson had
identified it as such at trial. The argument was a fair comment on the evidence
and did not misstate Johnson's testimony.
The prosecutor's argument regarding Johnson's admissions to Officer
Milovanovic was also a fair characterization of the evidence presented at trial.
Officer Milovanovic testified that, when Johnson was arrested on October 24,
2007, he had "quite a bit of' UPR number six and number ten signal wire in his
vehicle. (Tr., p.153, Ls.5-23.) When questioned about that wire, Johnson told
the officer that "he knows its wrong, but it got caught on his truck, that he didn't
actually cut it down." (Tr., p.162, Ls.6-15.)
During closing, the prosecutor characterized the substance of Johnson's
admissions to Officer Milovanovic as knowing the wire "was probably stolen."
(Tr., p.324, Ls.15-18.) Johnson argues on appeal that this was error because,
he contends, there is a difference between knowing it was "wrong" to take the
wire and knowing it was "probably stolen."

(Appellant's brief, pp.45-46.)

Johnson's argument fails because the prosecutor was entitled to argue
reasonable inferences from the evidence,

a,
Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77

P.3d at 969, and the reasonable inference arising from Johnson's admission that
he knew it was "wrong" to take the wire is that he also knew the wire was not his
to take, i.e., it was stolen. Moreover, Johnson's trial counsel apparently did not

believe the difference between "wrong" and "stolen" was anything more than one
of semantics because she, too, characterized the substance of Johnson's
admission to the officer as knowing the wire "was stolen." (Tr., p.368, Ls.1-3.)
Johnson has failed to establish error in relation to the prosecutor's argument
Finally, Johnson's argument on appeal that the prosecutor created the
,

.

false impression that Johnson's admissions related to the wire he sold to Pacific
Steel, rather than to the wire that was in his possession when he was arrested, is
itself a mischaracterization of the prosecutor's argument.

The prosecutor

actually argued:
We also have the arrest on the 24'h by ... Officer
Milovanovic. He assists in the arrest with the defendant, finds all of
this copper wire in the back of his truck. The copper wire that the
defendant said, oh, yeah, I ran over that copper wire too when I
was out there. And this time it was already cut up for me so I didn't
have to do anything. I just put it in the back of my truck.
Well, according to the officer, after the defendant had
waived his Miranda rights, he made admissions to the officer.
yeah, I knew it was probably stolen. Yeah, but I didn't cut it down.
That was his response. I knew I shouldn't have had it, but I'm not
the one that cut it down.
(Tr., p.324, Ls.7-20.) It is clear, in context, that the prosecutor specifically tied
Johnson's admission to the wire in his possession on the day of his arrest.
Although the prosecutor ultimately asked the jury to infer from that admission
that Johnson also knew the wire he sold to Pacific Steel between October 4thand
October 22"d was stolen

(see Tr.,

p.318, L.25

-

p.325, L.5), she never

represented to the jury that Johnson had made any inculpatory statements about
the wire that was the subject of the grand theft charge in this case.

Because a review of the record shows that the prosecutor did not
mischaracterize the evidence, Johnson has failed to show any error, much less
fundamental error that deprived him of a fair trial.

v.
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine
Is Applicable To This Case
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v.
Martinez, 125 ldaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.

State v.

Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Johnson has failed to
show that two or more errors occurred and, as such, has failed to show that the
doctrine of cumulative error is a~plicableto this case. See, e.&, LaBelle v.

State, 130 ldaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in
the trial had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that
would require reversal. State v. Gray, 129 ldaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 ldaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct.
App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless).

VI.
Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Award Of Restitution
A.

Introduction
Johnson argues the district court erred when it awarded restitution in the

amount of $2000. (Appellant's brief, pp.48-49.) His argument is unavailing. The

restitution award is supported by substantial evidence. Johnson has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion.
5.

Standard Of Review
"The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within

the discretion of a trial court." State v. Smith, 144 ldaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275,
280 (Ct. App. 2007).

"The detqrmination of the amount of restitution is a

question of fact for the trial court whose findings will not be disturbed if supported
by substantial evidence."

Id. (citing State v. Hamilton, 129 ldaho 938, 943, 935

P.2d 201, 206 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

The Restitution Award Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
Idaho's restitution statute authorizes trial courts to award restitution for the

actual economic loss suffered by crime victims as a result of the defendant's
criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304(2) and (7);

Smith,144 ldaho at 692, 169 P.3d

at 280. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a),
...
economic loss "includes, but is not
limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed,
lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses." See also Smith, 144
ldaho at 692, 160 P.3d at 280. For purposes of determining the amount of
restitution to be ordered, the term "value" means "the market value of the
property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time
after the crime." I.C. §§ 18-2402(11)(1) and 19-5304(1)(c); Smith,144 ldaho at

692, 160 P.3d at 280. Also for purposes of determining restitution, value need
only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. 3 19-5304(6).
Johnson's argument on appeal that the district court abused its discretion
in awarding UPR $2000 in restitution is based entirely upon his faulty assertion
that "the fair market value of the wires alleged to have been stolen was
measured by the price that was paid by Pacific Steel and Recycling - $665.05."
(Appellant's brief, p.49.) For the reasons set forth in Section II(C), supra, the
state presented substantial evidence at trial from which court could conclude that
there is no market for signal wire that has been destroyed and, as such,
replacement cost was the appropriate method of valuation. Also for the reasons
set forth in Section II(C), supra, the state presented substantial evidence that the
replacement value of the stolen wire was $2000. Because the evidence at trial
supports the court's award of restitution, Johnson has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
order of restitution.
DATED this 28th day of September 2009.
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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
places upon the State the burden of proving the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, a Defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no
evidence against the Defendant. If, after considering all the evidence and my
instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt, you
must return a verdict of not guilty.
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because
everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. It is the State of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge.

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTION NO. 13
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be carried by the
State of Idaho do not require the State to prove every fact and every circumstance put
in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof extends only to the
material elements of the offense. These material elements are set forth in the following
instruction.

APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION NO. 13-A
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of Theft by Possession of Stolen Property,
the state must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about or between October 4, 2007 and October 22,2007,

2.

in the state of Idaho

3.

the defendant Lonnie Johnson knowingly disposed of stolen property, to
wit: copper wire,

4.

either knowing the property was stolen by another or under such
circumstances as would reasonably induce the defendant to believe the
property was stolen,

5.

such property was in fact stolen, and

6.

any of the following occurred:
(a) the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the
use or benefit of the property, or
(b) the defendant knowingly used, concealed or abandoned the property in
such manner as to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of
the property, or
(c) the defendant used, concealed, or abandoned the property knowing
that such use, concealment or abandonment would have probably
deprived the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.

Property is stolen when a person wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds it from
the owner with the intent to deprive the owner of the property or to appropriate it to any
person other than the owner.

APPENDIX D

INSTRUCTION NO. 13-C

If the evidence shows that the defendant toolc, obtained, or withheld property by theft at
various times from t11e s a n e person; and that the value of the property taken in each theft was
one thousand dollars ($1000) or less; and that the property was taken, obtained, or withheld
pursuant to one overall illtent or plan to coinillit a series of thefts; then you are toadd together
the values of all the property taken, obtained, or withheld pussuant to tliat overall illtent or plan.
If the total value of such property is Inore tl~anone thousand dollars ($1000), then the crime is
Grand Theft. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a theft is grand
tlleft. If a theft is not grand theft, the11 it is petit theft.

APPENDIX E

INSTRUCTION NO. 13-F

The tern1 "value" as used in these instructions means as follows:
The inarlcet value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if the marltet value
callnot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacelllent of the property witllin a
reasonable tiine after the crime.

When the value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to any of the
above standards its value shall be deeilled to be one thousand dollars ($1000) or less.

